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ROBERT
BENJAMIN NAESER" and LYNNE LEWIS
BENNETT"

The Cost of Noncompliance: The
Economic Value of Water in the
Middle Arkansas River Valley
ABSTRACT

In the third, and most recent, dispute between the states
ofKansas and Coloradoover the apportionmentof Arkansas River
flows, the Supreme Court held Coloradoliablefor underdeliveries
of water to Kansas. Decisions in earlier cases centered on the
Court'sapplicationof the doctrine ofequitable apportionmentand
were decided in Colorado'sfavor. Improved understanding of
hydrologic connections between surface and groundwater flows
along the Arkansas River allowed Kansas to finally prove that
continuing water development in southeastern Colorado was
occurring to the detriment of Kansas irrigators. The two states have
agreed that over the 1950 to 1985 period Colorado underdelivered

328,000 acre-fret ofArkansas River water.
Estimationof damages will require some measure of the
value of the water used by Colorado or the losses to Kansasfor not
having use of the water. This paper contains estimates of the
average value of water used in irrigatingcrops in southeastern
Coloradoand southwestern Kansas. An attempt is also made to
calculate direct economic benefits associated with applying the
disputed water in southeastern Colorado. While the numbers
presented in this paperareonly estimates, the discussionhighlights
the complexity involved with calculating both water values and
associated economic impacts. In addition, the issues of enforcing
and monitoringwater allocationagreements are illustrated.
INTRODUCTION

Twenty-one times in the history of the western United States,
various groups of states have negotiated interstate river compacts to
govern water allocations. These compacts have the primary goal of ending
or preventing disputes between riparian states to interstate rivers. While
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many of the negotiations included discussions of equitable apportionment
and of current and future uses, few negotiations included economic
efficiency considerations as a factor in apportionment between states.
Relative values of water to each state play an important role in predicting
whether or not a compact is effective. When compacts fail, and they do,
economic damages are one of the primary considerations.
Disagreements over interstate river compact allocations, resulting
from underdelivery of water by upper basin states, have been the focus of
several lawsuits between upper and lower basin states. A recent case in
which damages were assessed is the Texas v. New Mexico suit over Pecos
River Compact violations. Analyses of direct and indirect economic
impacts were critical in the resolution of this case. New Mexico was found
to be in violation of the compact as a result of underdeliveries of water;
however, analysis of regional spillover benefits showed greater economic
benefits to Texas if the water continued to be used in New Mexico.'
Irrigators in New Mexico, being closer to Texas suppliers, purchased most
of their inputs in Texas. New Mexico's use of the disputed water created
multiplier effects that benefited the Texas economy.3 Furthermore, the
water reaching Texas is of poor quality after flowing through salt beds in
New Mexico and leaching water must be applied by the Red Bluff
Irrigation District.4 Thus, while all parties were in agreement that the
marginal value of water to New Mexico was greater and providing
additional water to Texas would reduce allocation efficiency, the compact
allocation rule specified Texas was to receive additional water and some
$16 million in damages.' In hindsight, failure to incorporate economic
considerations into compact negotiations may have predestined the
compact to failure.
The most recent case concerning underdeliveries of water by an
upper basin state to a lower basin state is Kansas v. Colorado.' At the
conclusion of the liability phase, Colorado was found to be in violation of
the Arkansas River Compact.7 Kansas and Colorado now agree that
Colorado underdelivered 328,000 acre-feet (af) of Arkansas River water to

1. Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124 (1987).
2. See J.Hamilton et aL, InteregionalSpillovers inRegionalImpact Assessment: New Mexico,
Texas and the Supreme Court, 25 GROWTH AND CHANGE 87 (1994); Bruce Frederick, Salvaged
Water: The Failed CriticalAssumption Underlyingthe Pews River Compact, 33 NAT. RESOURCES
J.217 (1993).
3. See Hamilton et al., supranote 2.
4. See Lynne L Bennett and Charles W. Howe, The InterstateRiver Compact: Incentivesfor
Noncompliance,34 WATER RESOURCES RESEARCH 3 (1998).
5. See generally Texas v. New Mexico, 482 US. 124.
6. Kansas v. Colorado, 514 U.S. 673 (1995).

7. Id.at 693-94.
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Kansas between 1950 and 19858 (1986-1995 underdeliveries undetermined
to date). As a result, southeastern Colorado irrigators must cease pumping
from, or find augmentation water for, approximately 2,000 alluvial wells
and the state of Colorado will likely be assessed financial damages arising
from 45 years of underdelivery of water to Kansas.'
While the liability phase of this case is complete, the Supreme
Court has remanded the case back to the Special Master for determination
of damages.' Because the ultimate decision as to the form of restitution has
yet to be decided, this case provides an opportunity to estimate economic
benefits accrued to southeastern Colorado from using the disputed water.
To this end, average irrigation values for the region are estimated and
economic impacts are discussed. We then examine the current lawsuit on
the Arkansas River in the interest of both examining gains and losses to the
two states involved, but also in an effort to highlight the importance of
appreciating the value of water in competing uses. Finally, future potential
disputes associated with other competing uses and over water quality are
highlighted. The principles and techniques presented will be of use to
policymakers trying to understand how economic benefits are calculated
in this, and other, interstate river compact disputes.
I. THE MIDDLE ARKANSAS RIVER VALLEY
The focus of this paper is the agricultural region extending from
Pueblo, Colorado to Garden City, Kansas (middle Arkansas River Valley).
As the middle Arkansas River Valley covers parts of two states, southeastern Colorado and southwestern Kansas, its water use is governed by
the Arkansas River Compact. Southeastern Colorado includes Pueblo,
Crowley, Otero, Bent, Prowers and Kiowa counties. In Kansas, Finney,
Hamilton and Kearny counties are part of the river basin. Agriculture is the
largest water user in the region (97 percent). Table I provides a summary
of the region by state.

8. David Robbins, Address at the Arkansas River Basin Forum Annual Meeting (1996).
9. Id.
10. Kansas v. Colorado, 514 U.S. at 694.
11. UNrrED STATES GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, 1990 WATER USE TABLES.
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Table 1. The Middle Arkansas River Valley Study Area'

Number of Farms
Total Acreage in Farms
Total Acres of Cropland
Total Acres Harvested
Irrigated Acres Harvested
Population

Southeastern
Colorado

Southwestern
Kansas

2,437
4,633,707
1,313,603
589,205
272,574
167,280

1,012
1,795,637
1,387,763
715,551
316,535
39,490

Farmers in the middle Arkansas River Valley grow many different
types of crops on both irrigated and non-irrigated land. Crops produced in
the middle Arkansas River Valley fall into two categories: specialty crops
that require additional processing before reaching the market; and those
delivered directly to the end-user. Specialty crops include melons, onions,
tomatoes and flower seeds.0 Southeastern Colorado is renowned for Rocky
Ford melons, which are crated and shipped all over the United States.'
Specialty crops represent a small percentage of all irrigated crops harvested
in a given year; approximately 2.4 percent." Wheat, sorghum, hay, dry
beans, corn, barley and oats are the principal crops produced in the middle
Arkansas River Valley." These crops are produced on both irrigated and
non-irrigated land. Table 2 summarizes the major crops grown in the
middle Arkansas River Valley.

12.

BURnAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DB'r. OF COMMMcE, 1992 CENSUS OF AGmICULTURE

13. See Charles W. Howe et al.,
The Economic Impacts of Agriculture-to-Urban Water

Transferson the Area of Origin:A Case Study of the Arkansas River Valley in Colorado,72 AMEL.
J.AGRc. ECON. 1200 (1990).
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. Robert Naeser, Things to do Before the Well Rims Dry: Estimation of Irrigation Water
Values Along the Middle Arkansas River (1997) (unpublished Masters thesis, Yale University)

(on file with author).
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Table 2.1975-1995 Average Harvested Acreage
in the Middle Arkansas River Valley17
Crop
Corn for
Grain
All Wheat
Sorghum
Corn for
Silage
Barley
Oats
Dry Beans
Hay
Total

Southeastern Colorado
Irrigated
Non-irrigated
Acreage
Acreage

Southwestern Kansas
Irrigated
Non-irrigated
Acreage
Acreage

45,686
29,873
36,589

3,140
320,772
49,717

101,743
89,986
45,390

1,463
412,676
52,319

8,093
1,600
787
5,457
272,840
400,92518

0
2,225
1,104
1,752
34,392
458,788

n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
237;119

n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
466,458

II. HISTORY OF ARKANSAS RIVER DISPUTES

Apportionment of Arkansas River flows has been the focus of conflict
between the states of Kansas and Colorado three times this century: Kansas
v. Colorado (1907)," Colorado v. Kansas (1943)," and Kansas v. Colorado
(1995). The driving force in each of the three suits over delivery of
Arkansas River water is Kansas' claim that Colorado irrigators are using

17. NATIONAL AGJCULTURAL STATISrICS SERVICE, UNrED STATES DEPARmENr OF
AGRICULTURE, CROPS CouNTY DATA FILs (1997). Where "n/a" is used, it denotes data that
was not readily available from USDA-NASS or Kansas Agricultural Statistics Service. Kansas
Agricultural Statistics Service provides data on total acres harvested but does not break it
down into irrigated and non-irrigated acres.
18. There are two explanations for the difference between the southeastern Colorado
irrigated acreage totals presented in Tables 1 and 2. First, the census data is for 1992 and the
computed average covers the years 1975 through 1995. Out-of-basin transfers resulting in
drying up of previously irrigated land could account for the lower total in the 1992 census.
Second, Table 2 provides a summary of acres of crops harvested throughout the year. Since
many farmers plant both winter and summer crops, Table 2 may double count some acreage
whereas Table 1 lists irrigated acreage for the entire year regardless of the number of crop
rotations.
19. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
20. Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383 (1943).
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more than their fair share of river flows. Kansas failed to prove, in the
earlier cases, that Colorado had materially decreased Arkansas River flows
and that the alleged decreases worked to the detriment of Kansas'
interests. 2
Following the 1943 case, the Supreme Court recommended that the
two states enter into compact negotiation-the intent being to avoid further
conflict.' The Arkansas River Compact was ratified by the legislatures of
Kansas and Colorado and the U.S. Congress in 1949.1 The Compact has
two main purposes; (1) to settle existing disputes and prevent future
controversies over Arkansas River water; and (2) to equitably apportion
Arkansas River water as well as the benefits from John Martin Reservoir.2
Article V of the Compact apportions the water in John Martin Reservoir
and specifies the operating standards for the reservoir.' Article IVcontains
the material depletion clause that prohibits future developments that
materially deplete the usable flow of the river.'
The material depletion clause reflects the intent of the framers to
protect existing users of the river. ' 'However, it is ambiguous since it does
not set forth a specific quantity of usable water. As a result, this most recent
case centers on translating "usable quantity" into a numerical value against
which material depletion can be quantified.'
A. Kansas v. Colorado (1995)
In 1983 the Kansas State legislature authorized a preliminary study to
determine whether adequate evidence existed to demonstrate material
depletions in Arkansas River flow caused by post-Compact well pumping
in Colorado and the operation of two of the federal reservoirs in
Colorado."' This study made several findings important to the issue of
material depletion." First, stateline flows have declined by an average of

21. For a more detailed discussion of these early cases, see Naeser, supranote 16; Mark

J. Wagner, Note, The Partingof the Waters-The Dispute Between Coloradoand Kansas Over the
Arkansas River, 24 WASHBURN LJ.99 (1984).
22, See Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. at 392.
23. Arkansas River Compact, ch. 155, 63 Stat. 145 (1949); 1949 Colo. Sess. Laws 485, § 1
(codified at C.R.S. § 37-69-101 (1973)); 1949 Kan. Sess. Laws 829 (codified at Kan. Stat. Ann.

§ 82a-520).
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

See Arkansas River Compact, art. L
See id., art.V.
See id., art. IV.
See Wagner, supra note 21.
See Lynne Bennett and Robert Naeser, The Arkansas River Compact: Integrated

Watershed Management as a Means of Conflict Prevention, 1997 AWRA/UCOWR Proc. 726.
29. See Kansas v. Colorado 514 U.S. at 679; see also 1983 Kan. Sess. Laws 194.
30. See Wagner, supra note 21 at 110.
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132,200 af per year since the Compact was ratified.3 Second, usable flows
for Kansas irrigators increased by an average of 9,200 af per year for the
first 24 years of the Compact, but in the next seven years declined by an
average of 62,200 af per year.' Average usable flow in the post-Compact
years is 105,600 af per year compared with 113,700 af per year in the preCompact period.' Third, inflows to John Martin Reservoir have declined
by an average of 152,000 af per year since the Compact was ratified.' The
Kansas study was undertaken in response to meetings between officials of
both states where Kansas suggested that Colorado was in violation of the
Compact. Colorado, of course, requested proof of the allegations and
denied any breach of the Compact.'
After attempts at negotiation failed, Kansas filed suit against Colorado
in 1985 claiming material depletion of usable state line flows.' Kansas
claimed that increases in post-Compact alluvial groundwater pumping by
southeastern Colorado irrigators caused a significant decline in usable state
line flows.Y At the time the Compact was ratified 121 alluvial wells were
in operation in Colorado. By 1972 the number of wells increased to 1,4772'
Kansas also claimed that Colorado's Winter Water Storage Program on the
Pueblo reservoir and Colorado's failure to abide by the Trinidad Reservoir
Operating Principles constituted violations of the Compact.'
The Supreme Court-Appointed Special Master decided in favor of
Kansas on the issue of post-Compact alluvial well development in
Colorado." As a result, Colorado must cease pumping or find replacement
water for approximately 2,000 tributary wells that are junior to Colorado's
obligation to Kansas. Colorado was found to not be in violation of the
Compact forits operations of the Trinidad and Pueblo reservoirs.'
At the time of this writing, the case has entered the damage phase.
Dollar amounts have yet to be determined. At the outset of the suit, Kansas
demanded more than 600,000 af of water and more than $100 million in
damages." Kansas now claims that accepting water as repayment would

31. Id. at 110.
32. Id. at 110.
33. Id. at 110.

34. Id. at 110.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

See Bennett and Naeser, supra note 28.
See Kansas v. Colorado 514 US. at 679.
See id. at 679-80.
Wagner, supra note 21 at 110.
Id. at 110.
See Kansas v. Colorado 514 U.S. at 680.
See id.
See, Robbins supra note 8.
See Kansas v. Colorado (1995) at 683-84.
Kansas Asks Limit on River Pumping, ROM MOUNTAIN NEWS, July 29,1995, at 5A.
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be too difficult in wet years and chancy in dry years, and is demanding a
monetary award amounting to the larger of either its overall financial loss
or Colorado's economic gains from the "stolen" water plus interest. '
Estimation of damages will require some measure of the value of the
water used by Colorado and Kansas irrigators. The remainder of the paper
is devoted to estimating the value of water used in irrigating crops in
southeastern Colorado and southwestern Kansas. An attempt is also made
to calculate direct economic benefits associated with applying the disputed
water in southeastern Colorado and direct economic losses sustained by
Kansas irrigators denied access to this water. It should be noted that the
numbers presented are only estimates. Rather, the discussion highlights the
complexity involved with calculating both water values and associated
economic impacts.
III. IRRIGATION WATER VALUES
The marginal value of water is the standard measure for economic
efficiency conditions. Efficient allocation between two uses is, in simple
terms, indicated by:
marginal value use. = marginal value useb
Naturally, if a and b refer to two areas of basins, there may be
numerous uses in each area. In this paper, we focus on the value of water
in irrigated agriculture. Values of irrigation water can be presented as
either marginal or average values. Average values represent the average
annual willingness to pay for an acre-foot of water while marginal values
are an estimate of willingness to pay for additional units of water.'
Average values are likely to be higher than marginal values since returns
per acre-foot at the margin are generally less than the average return from
all water applied.
Booker et al. (1990) emphasize that there is a concern that transfers of
agricultural water might result in the retirement of a broad class of crops.
This is likely the case in southeastern Colorado as the Kansas v. Colorado
decision requires that wells in Colorado shut down to increase usable flows
to Kansas. We assume that irrigated acreage in low valued crops will be
retired first or converted to non-irrigated acreage in the same crop. Under

45. Western Empire, THE DENVER Poes, April 10,1996, at B-4.
46. See Bonnie G. Colby, Estimating the Value of Water in Alternative Uses, 29 NAT.
RESOURCESJ. 511 (1989).
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this condition, the use of average returns to water for the crops to be retired
is an appropriate measure of value.47
Marginal analysis is appropriate for Kansas, as changes in water use
will be incremental, however, for comparative purposes, average values are
calculated for both states. Additionally, assuming diminishing marginal
productivity of water, average values will be higher than marginal. Thus
the values presented here are likely to represent the maximum amount
irrigators would be willing to pay for irrigation water.
Values of irrigation water can also be crop specific or for a mixture and
be based on short or long run costs. This paper focuses on short run
average values for specific crops under the assumption that fixed costs are
not a majorfactor in annual planting. Analysis is limited to lower income,
non-specialty crops as we reasonably assume that the wells in question are
used to irrigate these types of crops. Average irrigation water values for
southeastern Colorado and southwestern Kansas are estimated using the
farm crop budget technique and the yield comparison approach.
A. Farm Crop Budget Technique
The farm crop budget technique uses representative farm budgets to
estimate the maximum revenue share of water. These budgets are
produced annually and contain detailed cost figures per acre for both fixed
and variable costs along with average crop yields and prices received by
farmers. Subtracting total non-water input costs from total crop revenues
leaves a residual representing the maximum amount an irrigator would be
willing to pay for water and still cover production costs. The average water
values estimated here using the farm crop budget technique are short-run
values under the assumption that fixed costs are sunk and are not a major
consideration in annual cropping decisions.' Additionally, water
procurement costs are subtracted so water values are comparable with
other instream values.
As the U.S. Department of Agriculture-National Agriculture Statistics
Service (USDA-NASS) only publishes crop budgets for irrigated crops, we
assume that for the short-run crop budget analysis production inputs,
except water, are similar regardless of whether the crop is grown with

47. J. BOOIER ET AL, COLORADO WATER RESOURCES INSmTFIr,

COLORADO STATE

UNIVERSITY, ECONOMIC IMPACIS OF ALTERNATIVE WATER ALLOCATION INSrrfTlONS IN THE

CoLORADO RIVER BASIN, COMPLET;ON REPORT No. 161 (1991).

48. Short-run averages are based solely on the differmce between average per acre yields
and average per acre cash costs. These numbers are similar to those an irrigatorwould use in
making year to year production decisions. Long-run values are the difference between
average per acre returns and average total costs, both cash and economic costs.
49. DIANA C. GIBBONS, THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF WATER (1986).
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irrigation or without. Crop budgets published by the Department of
Agriculture and Resource Economics at Colorado State University support
this conjecture s ° Irrigated and non-irrigated winter wheat budgets for 1990,
for example, have non-water cash costs of $53.71 and $51.97 respectively."1
Should this not be the case, tle imputed value of water will be overstated
if more factor inputs are used in producing non-irrigated crops or
understated if the reverse.52
An additional assumption is that crop budgets are the same in both
southeastern Colorado and southwestern Kansas. This is not unreasonable
given the regions are climatically homogenous and input costs are similar.
This assumption was necessary because time and budgetary constraints
prohibited collecting crop budgets from the two states.
B. Yield Comparison Approach
The yield comparison approach is a variation of the crop budget
method. The yield comparison approach estimates the maximum
willingness to pay for water as the difference between average per acre
returns from irrigated and non-irrigated acreage.' This method defines the
increment in net producer income associated with adding water to the
production process as willingness to pay for water.' Dividing the
difference by the amount of water applied provides maximum willingness
to pay per acre-foot.
The simplicity of the yield comparison approach is appealing for
several reasons. First, it does not require the use of crop budgets. Budgets
can be difficult to obtain and one does not know if these budgets are
representative of farms in the area. Second, the difference between irrigated
and non-irrigated yields represents the revenue generated by irrigating-the
production value of the water. Finally, the yield comparison approach
looks only at the relative difference in yields across the region.
Theoretically, the yield comparison approach provides an estimate of the
value of water in each area regardless of homogeneity since it is a measure
of increased yields available from adding irrigation to the production
process.

50. COLORADO STATE UNIVERsrsy COOPERATIVE EXENSION, SELECTED 1990-1991 CROP
ENrERPRiSE BUDGEIs FOR COLORADO, DARE INFORMATION RE'oR IR.M
92-1 (1992).

51.
52.
53.
54.

Id.
See id.
See GIMONS, supra note 49.
See Robert Young and Robert Haveman, Economics of Water Resources: A Survey, in

HANDsOOK OF NATURAL RESOURcE AND ENERGY ECONOMIcs 465 (Allen V. Kneese and James
L. Sweeney eds., 1985).
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C. Methodological Considerations
The short-run farm crop budget approach and the yield comparison
approach assign different values to water because the techniques measure
fundamentally different values. The yield comparison approach measures
the value of water to the user, i.e., the additional revenues available to a
farmer from the application of irrigation water.' Under the assumption
that factor input costs are similar, the average value of water estimated
using this methodology represents the normal profits available from
application of irrigation water.
Alternatively, the short-run farm crop budget approach measures an
irrigator's maximum willingness to pay for water. This is accomplished by
assigning the difference between the gross value of product and the cost of
all non-water inputs. The farm crop budget approach does not incorporate
normal profits as it identifies the maximum willingness to pay for water
driving profits to zero unless specified in the budget.'
When attempting to estimate economic impacts from the gain or loss
of water, the yield comparison approach provides a quick and simple
means of accomplishing this task. As direct economic benefits are related
to increases, or decreases, in per acre yields from irrigation, or lack of, the
imputed value of water from the yield comparison approach is a measure
of the production value of water. If information on quantity of disputed
water and application rates is available, direct impacts from irrigation by
crop can be estimated using the following:
Direct Economic Impact =
(Yield Comparison Estimates [$Iaft) * (Quantity of Disputed Water [afi)
A limiting factor in either approach is that water values are highly
dependent on the market value of the product and the cost of factor
inputs.' As a result, fluctuations in market prices will be reflected in the
imputed value of water.
All data used in this study, both production information and economic
values were obtained from USDA-NASS. Nominal prices are adjusted to
$1995 using the producer price index for farm products. '

55. See A. BURRIULL, ASSESSING THE SOCIETAL VALUE OF WATER INrIS USES (1997).

56. See GIBuoNs, supra note 49.
57. See BURRILL, supra note 55.
58, BUREAU OF LABOR STATIsTIcs, PRoDUCER PRICE INmEx-COMMODTIEs: FAM PRODucIs
(1297).
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The next section presents the results from the regional average water
valuations. For comparison, estimates from both the short-run farm crop
budget and yield comparison approaches are included.
D. Irrigation Water Values in Southeastern Colorado and Southwestern
Kansas
Limited crop production data for southwestern Kansas restricts the
regional analysis for both states to corn for grain, sorghum and wheat."
However, these three crops represent a large percentage of the low valued
crops harvested on both irrigated and non-irrigated acreage in both
regions. Table 3 summarizes average water values for the major crops
grown in southeastern Colorado.
Table 3. Estimated Value of Irrigation Water Applied to Three Crops
in Southeastern Colorado (1995 $)
Crop

$/Acre
Irrigated

Corn - Grain
Sorghum
All Wheat

$/Acre NonIrrigated

$/af - yield
comparison
approach

$306
$151
$165

$57
$61
$81

$124
$45
$42

$58
$28
$48

$218

$78

$76

$45

$/af-short
run crop
budget

Regional
Average

Regional averages are weighted by total acreage harvested for each
crop. In southeastern Colorado, these three crops average net returns of
$218 per irrigated acre and $78 per non-irrigated acre. Average water
values are $45 using the short-run crop budget method and $76 with the
yield differential approach.
Table 4 summarizes the results from southwestern Kansas.

59. See Naeser, sra note 16 (presents average values for all major southeastern Colorado
crops).
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Table 4. Estimated Value of Irrigation Water Applied to Three Crops
in Southwestern Kansas (1995 $)
$/Acre NonIrrigated

$/af - yield
comparison
approach

$350
$202
$157

$103
$88
$102

$122
$57
$28

$81
$54
$44

$248

$100

$74

$62

Crop

$/Acre
Irrigated

Corn - Grain
Sorghum
All Wheat
Regional
Average

$/af-short
run crop
budget

Again, the regional averages are weighted by acres harvested. The
average value of water used to irrigate these three crops is $74 using the
yield differential approach and $62 using the short-run crop budget
analysis. The values presented in Tables 3 and 4 are not significantly
different from those estimated in earlier studies.60
The yield comparison and short-run crop budget approaches provide
useful estimates of the average value of water in the middle Arkansas River
Valley. Results from the yield comparison approach are inconclusive
suggesting that the production value of water is similar in both regions.
The average value of water in southwestern Kansas, as estimated with the
short-run crop budget approach, is greater than the average value in
southeastern Colorado. This, coupled with greater net returns per acre in
southwestern Kansas, suggests that Kansas irrigators realize greater yields
than their Colorado counterparts from similar quantities of factor inputs.
If marginal values are also higher in Kansas, which is likely given that
average values are higher, then delivering water to southwestern Kansas
irrigators enhances economic efficiency.
IV. ECONOMIC IMPACTS
Kansas is demanding a financial award equal to the gains to Colorado
or losses to Kansas, whichever is larger. While it would be useful to present
comparative calculations of both figures, we simply present an estimate of
the gains to Colorado. Given that the returns to water in irrigated

60. See GiBFoNs, supra note 49.
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agriculture in Colorado are similar to those for Kansas, any potential gains
to Kansas from receiving more water are likely to be similar to Colorado's
losses from delivering additional water. Because average values are the
appropriate measure of value for Colorado, but not necessarily for Kansas
(where changes in water use will be incremental), the figures presented
here represent a partial analysis of economic impacts.
Direct economic gains to Colorado are estimated using 9,371 af of
disputed water per year."1 The average mountain states irrigator applies
24.5 inches (approximately 2 af) of irrigation water each season,' so 9,371
af of water will irrigate 4,686 acres. As the two states have not agreed on
the amount of usable flow denied Kansas from 1986 through 1995, it is
assumed that this figure will be at least as much as 9,371 af per year.
Economic gains to southeastern Colorado are estimated using average
production values for the 1975-1995 period. The 4,686 acres are allocated
among crops according to regional cropping patterns over the study period
for the three-crop analysis. Summing the value of crops produced provides
an average annual return from the disputed water over the 1975-1995 study
period.
A. Economic Benefits to Southeastern Colorado
Determining gains and losses to the respective regions depends
critically on underlying assumptions about production in lieu of irrigation
water. One obvious scenario assumes that acreage is cropped regardless of
irrigation water availability (Scenario 1). A second assumes no production
without irrigation water (Scenario 2).
Scenario 1 presents the most likely estimate of economic gains to
Colorado over the 1950 to 1995 period. Groundwater development in
southeastern Colorado began around 1934 when the area was struggling
with drought. Dry years in 1944, 1954 and 1964 increased the use of
groundwater pumps. Many of these wells were drilled for supplemental
water as farmers already had water rights in existing ditch companies.'
Existing farms attempting to augment insufficient surface water rights
undertook groundwater development." This suggests that these farmers
possessed junior water rights, decreed at the time the ditches were
constructed. Assuming that these farmers understood that availability of

61. The two states have agreed that Colorado underdelivered 328,000 af of water between
1950 and 1985. This works out to an average of 9,371 af per year.
62. REsouRcEs AND TECHNOLOGY DIVISION, USDA ECONOMIC REsARcH SERviCE,
AGRiCULTURAL RE oURCFs CROPLAND, WATER, AND CONERVATION SITUATION AND OUTOOK
REPORT (1993).
63. See F. MnEsiC, WATER THE ANSWER TO ADESERT'S PRAYER (1990).

64. Seeid.
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water under later decrees was not guaranteed, they opted to commence
farming anyway. As expenses had to be met regardless of water
availability, non-irrigated crops were planted in years when senior
appropriators took all of the water. Groundwater pumping enabled
irrigators to avoid fluctuations in surface water availability. Thus, we
assume that crops are produced without irrigation when water is not
available.
The crop mix over the study period shows, on average, 41 percent of
the irrigated acreage is planted with corn-grain, 32 percent with sorghum
and 27 percent with wheat. Irrigating 4,686 acres with this crop mix
generates $1.02 million in average annual direct benefits.' Over the 19501995 period, irrigating with Kansas' water generated $45.9 million in
revenues for southeastern Colorado farmers. Dryland farming on these
same acres would still have generated $16.5 million in revenues from 19501995, or $366,000 per year.
By using water that legally belonged to Kansas, southeastern Colorado
gained an additional $654,000 per year in direct benefits over potential
returns from growing the same crops without irrigation. Total direct
economic gains to southeastern Colorado amount to $29.4 million over the
1950-1995 period. Again, that figure represents the difference between
revenues from irrigating with the disputed water and potential returns
from dryland farming on the same acreage. Comparatively, using the
formula presented earlier in the paper, direct economic impacts average
$712,000 per year." Again, note that these figures represent upper bounds
given that marginal values will be less. Therefore, the likely upper bound
on direct economic gains ranges from $654,000-$712,000 per year.
Indirect benefits include the multiplied effect of agricultural
expenditures through the local, and state economy. The magnitude of
indirect benefits depends on how resources have been used in the regions.
Under Scenario 1 secondary impacts associated with the disputed water are
limited to changing property values, savings rates and tax revenues. Factor
input purchases do not change because farmers are still purchasing inputs
regardless of whether acreage is irrigated or not. Thus, indirect impacts in
the regions are small, concentrated on the individual farmer rather than the
local economy.
These are some of the types of economic considerations that should be
taken into account during the damage phase of this case. This partial

65. Direct economic benefits include crop revenues and factor input purchases.
66. Direct economic impacts = $76/af * 9,371 af/year water = $712,196/year. The $76
amount is the southeastern Colorado regional average water value estimated using the yield
comparison approach (Table 3).
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analysis alludes to the complexities involved with damage estimation that
the courts will have to address.
B. Discussion
The 1986 case concerned only agricultural water use. Economic
efficiency would see water move from lower to higher valued agricultural
uses. The analysis presented here is inconclusive with regard to which
region has higher valued agricultural uses. However, agriculture is no
longer the highest value water use in either region. While irrigated
agriculture has always been, and continues to be, the largest water user in
the region, changing demands for water place increasing pressure on
Arkansas River flows. When the Arkansas River Compact was ratified in
1949, irrigated agriculture was the sole user of Arkansas River water.
Today irrigators are one of many groups interested in river flows.
Recreationalists on the upper reaches (above Pueblo Reservoir) are
demanding flows to maintain aquatic habitat and enhance the recreation
experience.' Colorado's ever-thirsty Front Range cities are buying
agricultural water to meet future demand. Cities along Colorado's Front
Range have paid up to $8,000 per af, or $800/af per year, for Arkansas
River water rights.' Thus, if values to other uses are considered, the verdict
may be sub-optimal as it reduces the amount of water available for
potential future higher value uses.
It is also likely that the outcome of the 1986 case will have little impact
on the agricultural economy in southeastern Colorado. As stated in the
preceding section, if farmers whose wells are shut down continue to plant
dryland crops, annual revenues could decrease from $1.02 million to
$366,000. These figures, however, may be misleading. The Southeastern
Colorado Water Conservancy District (SCWCD) formed the Southeastern
Colorado Water Activity Enterprise (SCWAE) to assist well owners with
development of augmentation plans, and will function as a broker selling
augmentation water."
SCWAE has identified several sources of augmentation water
including return flows from: Fryingpan-Arkansas project water; City of
Pueblo water; and City of Colorado Springs water. SCWCD members have
first right of refusal on these waters before being offered to non-member

67. See Robert Naeser and Mark Smith, Playing with Borrowed Water: Conflicts Over
InstreamFlows on the Arkansas River,35 NAT. REsoURcES J.93 (1995).
68. See id.
69.

See BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, DRAFr ARKANSAS RIVER WATER NEEDS

ASSESSMENT. INSTIriTIONAL AND LEGAL ANALYSIS (1996) [hereinafter, BLM].

Summer 1998]

THE COST OF NONCOMPLIANCE

well owners." As of February 1996, the price of return flow water was $8
per af.n The stated price is far below average willingness to pay of $45 per
af (Table 3) in southeastern Colorado. The availability of inexpensive
augmentation water should eliminate most of the impacts from the recent
verdict. Additionally, the verdict could actually increase flows to Kansas
if augmentation water is not used to extinction by Colorado irrigators.
V. FUTURE PROSPECTS
The 1986 case may be the last lawsuit between Kansas and Colorado
over the quantity of flows delivered to Kansas. The agreement between the
two states seems to imply that both sides have settled on a quantity to
which Kansas is entitled, otherwise they could not have agreed to the
328,000 af depletion. Improved monitoring technology and better
understanding of hydrologic connections enabled Kansas to finally prove
underdeliveries of Arkansas River water by Colorado.
While the water quantity dispute seems to be resolved, at least for the
time being, water quality issues could be a problem in the future. Much like
previous arguments that Kansas sustained economic damage from
underdelivery of water, the same argument could be made that Kansas
irrigators sustain damage from applying highly saline water. As a result of
dependence on flood irrigation by Colorado irrigators, the middle
Arkansas River is the most saline stream of its size in the United States.n
Within the middle Arkansas River Valley average salinity levels increase
from 300 parts per million (ppm) total dissolved solids (IDS) east of Pueblo
to 4,000 ppm TDS near the Kansas state line.' TDS concentrations greater
than 2,000 ppm are considered unsuitable for agriculture, however such
water has been used in the valley for years!7 4
The effects of water quality on irrigation differ depending on
geographic location and crop selection. Upstream Colorado irrigators in
Pueblo and Otero counties divert high quality water and are able to grow
salt sensitive, specialty crops.7h Water entering canals in these upstream
counties has TDS concentrations averaging 500 ppm.7' However, 25 miles
downstream concentrations increase to 2,500 ppm forcing irrigators to

70. See id.
71. Id.
72. U.S. DEPARimT op AGRuLluu, USDA WATRR QUALnY HYDROLOGIC UNIT AREA
PKWLODrR COuLWrI COLORADO, IMPROVING QUALITY (1992) [hereinafter USDA).

73. Id.

74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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plant less salt sensitive crops--alfalfa, sorghum and wheat Water quality
is also a problem for domestic, municipal, industrial, recreational and
fishery use."
In addition to salinity problems, sulfate levels on the Kansas side of the
border can be as high as 2,400 ppm during low flow periods." Sulfate levels
are diluted by higher flows, but the river remains saline and sulfate levels
are still as high as 700 ppm.8' As a point of reference, the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has proposed a maximum
contaminant level (MCL) for sulfate of 400 ppm in drinking water. If such
factors are considered, then actual damages to Kansas are much higher.
However, this externality is not an issue addressed by the Compact.
In addition to the problems salinity imposes on downstream irrigators,
elevated TDS concentrations adversely impact aquatic habitat along the
river. Spawning beds and food sources are smothered by sediment, and
turbidity affects the feeding ability of aquatic fauna. Nutrients and
pesticides contained in the run-off consume available oxygen further
degrading aquatic habitats. Poor water quality in the Arkansas River has
eliminated fishing opportunities above John Martin Reservoir and
threatens aquatic populations in many of the popular recreational
reservoirs.81
Much of the river's flow soaks into the alluvial aquifer and
subsequently seeps into the underlying Ogalalla aquifer. The High Plains
Aquifer in southwestern Kansas includes both the Ogalalla and alluvial
aquifers. Based on current conditions, the Kansas Geological Survey
estimates that within 40 years polluted Arkansas River water will
contaminate 500 square miles of the High Plains Aquifer.2
Preliminary analysis did not provide any conclusive results showing
diminished yields from poor water quality. This may be a function of
Kansas irrigators using higher quality groundwater instead of saline
surface water or more efficient irrigation systems or growing lower income,
less salt sensitive crops. Within Colorado, per acre irrigated yields are
consistently lower in downstream counties suggesting some impacts from
poor water quality.'
Arkansas River water quality could be improved by implementation
of best management practices (BMPs) by Colorado irrigators, including

77. Id.
78. See USDA supra note 72.
79.
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improved irrigation efficiency 8 However, BMPs can be expensive and the
prior appropriation system does not reward irrigators for conserving
water. Thus, it may take another lawsuit to improve water quality in the
river.
Colorado's failure to abide by the terms of the Arkansas River
Compact has led to a lawsuit that has been in the courts for over a decade.
The case and its outcome emphasize the need for allocation rules to
incorporate flexibility-allowing water to move to higher valued uses-and
strong enforcement and monitoring mechanisms. The current condition of
the river also highlights the need for future negotiations over water
allocation to integrate water quality concerns into the discussion. If these
factors are not considered then the agreement, like the Arkansas River
Compact, may be doomed to fail.

84. See USDA, supra note 72.

